

X.509 PKI RA schema for Æ-DIR

Note: The RA is the hard part in a PKI!

Disclaimer: Draft concepts ahead...

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RA -- Registration Authority

- PKIX (RFC 5280) defines:
...an optional system to which a CA delegates certain management functions;
- Does this public key belong to this end entity (EE)?
- In case of service certs (server and client):
Securely authorize an admin to request cert on behalf of EE
- EE and admin identifiers
- Secure authentication and authorization

Æ-DIR already has...

- Unique constraints for all relevant entity identifiers: uid, host/aeFqdn, etc.
- Paranoid user management
- Administrative relationship of hosts and services
- ACLs for maintaining aeHost, aeService, aeSrvGroup entries
- Two-factor authentication (OATH-LDAP → LDAPcon 2015)
- LDAP server already installed with high availability

Let's Encrypt integration

- HTTP(S) servers might not have DocumentRoot or you don't want to write there
- Prefer config mgmt (no *certbot* on systems)
- Add ACME challenge to aeHost, aeService, aeSrvGroup entry (aeFqdn=foo.example.com) -- Æ-DIR's ACLs in effect!
- Return ACME challenge via proxy (authz by challenge-ID):
 - `http://foo.example.com/.well-known/acme-challenge`
 - tricky with authoritative DNS servers (TXT query type)

Let's Encrypt caveats

- Currently only server certs
- Let's Encrypt limitations:
 - no IDNA DNS names allowed
 - subject DN is only CN=foo.example.com
 - Cert profile not customizable
- All FQDNs published to certificate transparency logs
- Replication latency (two-tier architecture)

Æ-PKI -- basic ideas

- Act as RA for custom X.509 PKI
- Needs more data associated with Æ-DIR entities:
 - CSR queue(s)
 - Cert archive
 - CA (policy)
 - workflow relationships
- Tightly couple cert subject DNs for Æ-DIR entity DNs:
Maybe equal or some simple mapping

Æ-PKI -- enrollment

- Well, we're at LDAPcon → let's use LDAP for enrollment
- Admin has to personally bind to Æ-DIR (e.g. with password and yubikey)
- Submitting a CSR is adding an entry to `cn=ae-pki`
- ACLs and constraints:
 - check whether admin has control over entry with `aeFqdn`
 - if admin does not have control allow `aepkiStatus` requested
- Picking up issued cert with simple search request

